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Thinking like a dog
1 I never cease to be intrigued by the way in which certain animals respond to humans
using tools. Let me give an example. When I am brushing away ashes in the fire hearth
our border collie will snap at the brush, but only when I am moving it. As soon as the
brush is  put down, and my hand withdrawn and the brush is  completely inert,  the
snapping and barking ceases. What is interesting about this observation is not simply
the phenomenon itself, but a paradox that lies at the heart of our wonderment at the
dog’s perception and comprehension. It is a relatively uninteresting inference to say
that when the tool is moving the dog responds to it as if the tool were animate. What is
more interesting is to note that the tool becomes animate because it is attached to me.
The dog knows me well enough and does not bark and snap when I am not brushing –
only when the activity involves certain kinds of tool that interact with the ground.
Thus, it does not happen when I am, say, using a hammer, or working at a bench. So,
why does it do so when I am using certain kinds of tool in a particular way? 
2 One possible explanation is that the dog responds to the brush because it thinks it is an
independent organism, and is assisting me with some herding process, or because its
close proximity must be threatening me. It responds to the brush as if a recalcitrant
sheep. So although it  can see that I  am the agent moving the brush it  responds as
though the  brush  was  independent  and  itself  had  agency.  Both  humans  and  other
animals attribute the qualities of living matter and agency to what we call tools and
other cultural objects, though a paradox may arise when autonomy is attributed to the
object  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  recognized  that  its  life-like  characteristics  are
motivated by human actions. 
3 In this paper I show how such an account of the interaction between dogs and tools
might  be  relevant  to  anthropological  debates  about  the  differences  between  the
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cognition of living and non-living things. I elaborate on how movement in its widest
sense is  critical  to the way humans recognize what is  alive.  I  do this by examining
certain kinds of tool and artefact that display movement and therefore are ‘life-like’,
and various liminal forms of life that folk classifications find difficult to handle. Nuaulu
in eastern Indonesia describe many kinds of object as having the qualities we might
otherwise reserve for biological organisms. They also distinguish entities (spirits) that
have many of the qualities of life but which ordinarily have no corporeal existence.
While all cultural objects are potentially regarded in this way, in practice some objects
are more alive and have more agency than others. 
4 Part of the problem with existing anthropological treatments of the category ‘living
things’ is that they are either logical extrapolations through polythetic extension, or
based  on  formal  taxonomic  deduction/induction  (ethnoscience).  Using  examples  of
meat-skewers,  outboard  motors,  sago-processing  devices  and  mechanical  graters,
together with certain forms of ‘peripheral’  biological  life such as fungi and algae,  I
demonstrate how Nuaulu ideas of what is animate and agentive are always fuzzy and
contingent, and that by combining data from different kinds of context, using different
elicitation procedures, a more complex picture emerges. Such an approach challenges
certain claims regarding the fundamental differences between the way humans cognize
biological and non-biological entities in practice, for example those of Scott Atran.
 
Tools, machines, and engines
5 Tools have been classified in many ways, but here it helps to distinguish between: (A)
tools that once made do not move (e.g. a stake), and (B) tools that move when activated
by the human body and are often characterised as an extension of the body. In a Nuaulu
context, these include a hammer, sago pounder, or the fire hearth brush. Type (C) tools
are  those  having  simple  moving  parts  that  relay  energy  released  by  initial  human
motion, such as the Nuaulu sago flour extraction device or treadle-operated coconut
grater.  These  are  effectively  ‘machines’,  using  mechanical  power,  having  several
moving parts for performing a particular task. Finally, there are (D) tools that are also
machines  in  the sense  outlined but  that  run on stored energy,  and do not  require
continuous human inputs. In the Nuaulu material universe these might include trucks,
chainsaws, or outboard motors.
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Figure 1. Series of Nuaulu asunaete: cuscus (Phalanger) skewers planted as an offering to ancestral
spirits.
Photo: Roy Ellen
6 A common type (A) tool would be a pit trap stake. Although Nuaulu might attribute
independent agency to a stake, I have no examples of this ever being the case. A more
interesting example would be a meat-skewer or asunaete (Figure 1). These are used in
the preparation and transport of  meat,  but they are also an instrument facilitating
communication between the living and ancestral spirits. Thus, after a wild pig has been
killed it will be singed to remove most body hair near to the place where it was caught
and before returning to the village. A fire is lit and a wooden stake cut to serve as a
skewer to manipulate the carcass. A chip from the skewer—representing its spirit—is
placed  inside  the  belly  of  the  pig,  removed  after  singing  and  re-united  with  the
asunaete. After the pig has been butchered, the skewer will be stuck in the ground and
the throat and lungs attached to the top as an offering to ancestral spirits, before being
taken back to  the  village.  A  similar  skewer  is  used for  marsupial  cuscus,  the  most
frequent animal hunted by Nuaulu. In this case, however, the skewers do not have the
organs  of  breathing  tied  to  them.  Having  served  their  purpose  in  cooking  and for
transport they are stuck in the ground and the chip initially removed to make the spike
is re-united with the skewer. In this way the asunaete has a simultaneous purpose of
skewering the meat, roasting it, carrying it, and ensuring that the spirit of the cuscus
returns to the cosmos and so sustain the population.
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Figure 2. Using a Nuaulu sago pounder.
Photo: Roy Ellen
7 Type (B) tools conform to our usual prototype of what a tool should be, and fit the idea
of prosthesis: for example, a sago pounder (Figure 2). But while tools become animated
by being body extensions, this is insufficient—unlike in dog-brush interaction—to make
them ‘animate’ in the sense understood by animism. Most Nuaulu tools, most of the
time, are not attributed with animacy. However, some are more likely to be, and we
need to identify what the conditions might be to satisfy this. In the first place, these
conditions relate to the kind of subsistence activity with which they are connected.
Thus, hunting and warfare are high-risk activities in which supernatural support can
make a difference. 
8 Secondly, some technologies are less under the continuous control of an operator. A
bamboo pounder never leaves the hand that holds it  during the actions entailed in
pounding sago pith. However, arrows once they leave the bow are subject to a variety
of hazards over which the archer has no direct control: wind, movement of the prey or
of objects intervening between the hunter and his prey. In this situation, to attribute an
arrow with agency and to make a preliminary offering to its embodied spirit to ensure
its effectiveness makes sense.
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Figure 3. A Nuaulu sacred shield.
Photo: Roy Ellen 
9 But there is an additional category where tools are always animate because of their
simultaneous status as ritual objects, and regardless of the extent to which they move.
In the first place, any tool that has been used in ritual becomes sacred and cannot be
disposed of, being stored until it disintegrates in the smoky lofts of clan houses. But
there  are  other  ritual  objects,  such  as  shields  nowadays  used  only  in  ceremonial
contexts (Figure 3). Most of these are not subject to special ritual attention, but a few
are  produced  and  stored  with  anthropomorphic  regard  under  controlled  ritual
circumstances.  To  have  all  shields,  or  whatever,  accorded special  respect  would  be
inconvenient, but to have just some objects in a given category with sacred agency is
sufficient (Ellen 1990).
 
Figure 4. Nuaulu sago-processing apparatus.
Diagram: Roy Ellen 
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10 The third tool type (C) are those with moving parts. Those that I discuss here are the
sago flour extraction apparatus and the treadle-operated coconut grater. Like type B
tools they are an extension of the body, but are so in a more complex way. This is the
case for many tools that we describe as machines, and we need to examine whether it
makes a difference when attributing agency or animacy. The first of these cases, what
Nuaulu call the aha, is a device of wide distribution in the Moluccas and New Guinea,
used  for  separating  starch  granules  from  pith  residue  (Figure  4).  The  apparatus
comprises two troughs made from sago leafstalk resting on a frame, in which one—the
input  trough—overlaps  with  and  is  slightly  higher  than  the  lower  output  trough.
Attached to the overlapping end of  the upper trough is  a  filter,  usually of  stitched
coconut  fibre.  The  upper  part  of  the  membrane  is  attached by  string  to  a  flexible
sapling that acts as a spring-loaded assembly. As water flows into the upper trough, the
resulting mulch is pressed against the filter with one hand and the string pulled down
with the other. Because of the flexibility of the sapling the membrane automatically
retracts, enabling further compression of the mulch, and is ready for the operator to
press  once  more.  Thus,  the  latent  energy produced by  the  bent  sapling assists  the
process of efficient filtering. There is a process of complex bodily engagement between
individual person and apparatus. The aha is never described in terms that would lead us
to  understand  that  it  is  anthropomorphised,  though  the  success  of  the  processing
activity is routinely ensured by making a small offering to the ancestral spirits who
own the sago, tucked into a convenient joint in the apparatus.
 
Figure 5. Treadle-operated coconut grater used in the Nuaulu village of Rouhua.
Photo: Roy Ellen
11 By contrast, the rotary action treadle-operated coconut grater (Figure 5) is of relatively
recent introduction,  and is  perhaps no older than the late nineteenth century.  The
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operator presses the treadle with one foot, which pulls a string that rotates a cutting
head,  first  in  one  direction and then in  the  other,  using  successive  actions  on the
treadle. The head is made of wood in which metal cutting blades are embedded, and
this assembly is attached to a spindle at waist height. As can be seen, the action—like
the sago flour processing apparatus—requires engagement with the whole body. There
are no associated ritual  practices,  though in several  technical  respects  the treadle-
operated coconut grater is comparable to the much older sago-washing device.
12 Finally, there are type (D) tools, engines driven by a non-human source of power, which
in the historical experience of the Nuaulu consist of devices reliant on steam power,
diesel, or petrol. These have been familiar parts of the Nuaulu world for over a century,
with steam and diesel driven boats, and power-driven ban saws used in timber yards.
The internal combustion engine found in trucks and generators mainly became familiar
along with aircraft during the second world war, and through increased travel. With
Indonesian independence the road system deteriorated and most devices with engines
were out of reach of most people in rural areas of Seram. As the economy grew under
the  New Order,  so  Nuaulu  became more  familiar  with  road  vehicles,  tools  such  as
chainsaws and especially the outboard motor.
13 What is relevant here is that Nuaulu treat outboard motors as essentially animate and
motivated by a spirit even though some have a good knowledge of the practicalities of
how they work.  Nevertheless,  when they go wrong Nuaulu will  make offerings and
invocations to get them moving. These offerings are basically no different from those
that  they  might  offer  before  hunting,  or  tuck  into  the  joints  of  a  sago  processing
apparatus. I was first introduced to this practice by a chance observation of Nuaulu
‘feeding an outboard motor’ in 1996. Up until that time no Nuaulu of my acquaintance
had  owned  an  outboard  motor  and  I  was  determined  to  follow  through  on  the
observation.  To  some  extent  this  fits  in  with existing  ritual  practices  relating  to
outrigger canoes and other sailing craft found in central Moluccan waters, which are
anthropomorphized and subjected to life-cycle rituals. However, the outboard motor
confers a new property on the vessel, namely a source of propulsion independent of
human bodily action.
14 While this has obvious technical advantages, it has the disadvantage that the operation
of the vessel is less under the control of the crew. In a sailing boat, the crew can appeal
to the spirits of the wind and may encourage them to blow by supplication in the form
of  banging  gongs  or  similar  metal  objects.  This  is  not  possible  with  a  jonson  (an
outboard motor) and it is hardly surprizing that the crew seek to maximize the forces
working in their favour when the risk is increased. 
15 In making sense of these machines and the practices that accompany them it is also
relevant that outboard motors and sago-grating machines, move, whirr, hum and get
hot when they are used. Moreover, tools that have a quasi-independent existence in not
needing  to  rely  on  continuous  human  power  also  resemble  biological  life  in  their
capacity to ‘die’. Nuaulu speaking of an outboard motor that has just spluttered to a
standstill will say mataenya – ‘it is dead’, just as we might use the same word to describe
a malfunctioning vehicle or power tool.
16 Maurice  Bloch  (1998)  notes  that  Zafimaniry  use  maty (an  Austronesian  cognate  of
Nuaulu matae) for anything that breaks down. So, the attribution of the qualities of life
to engines is hardly unique to the Nuaulu, and in Western societies too these same
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properties encourage modes of behaviour, emotion and linguistic expression that are
wholly compatible. 
 
Life as a taxonomic category
17 Nuaulu  ideas  about  animacy,  are—like  our  own—generally  fuzzy  and  contingent.
Nevertheless,  there have been repeated attempts to define the boundaries of  living
matter  and  what  this  might  imply.  These  approaches  come  from  philosophy,
developmental/cognitive psychology, twentieth century anthropology and particularly
ethnobiology or ethnoscience.
18 Let us start with the ethnoscience model.  Paul Taylor (1990) in his work on Tobelo
(Halmahera) ethnobiological classification uses a strict componential form of semantic
analysis (Figure 6). Quite reasonably, he begins by indicating that Tobelo distinguish
living from non-living, defining the former as entities able to die. But rather than talk
of living things he uses the term ‘biotic forms’, which he then says are divided into
‘sexual biotic forms’ that contrast with four other groups at the same taxonomic level:
coral, sponges, fungi, and ‘moss, mould, bryozoans, small algae’. ‘Sexual biotic forms’
are  in  turn  divided  into  ‘breathers’  and  ‘non-breathers’,  the  latter  exemplified  by
seaweed and black coral, and the former by fauna and flora.
 
Figure 6. Tobelo taxonomy of ‘biotic forms’ based on semantic componential analysis (Taylor 1990:
48)
19 Edmund Leach (1964) approached the problem in a different way, but with much the
same results (Figure 7). He adopts a kind of logical formalism derived from Lévi-Strauss
and Mary Douglas. The main problem with Leach, however, is not his underpinning
theory,  but  his  methods,  particularly  as  these  are  reflected  in the  diagrams  he
produced.  These  diagrams  are  drawn  from  Leach’s  imagination,  augmented  by  his
knowledge of the role of certain oppositions and notions from English popular culture
and sacred texts. Here, nature is not the same as ‘life’ or ‘living organisms’, or even less
Taylor’s ‘biotic forms’. Leach divides ‘nature’ into animate and inanimate, though we
are left to speculate whether this means that the category ‘inanimate’ includes some
living organisms, most obviously plants. His category ‘animate’ applies only to animals,
and is sub-divided into warm-blooded and cold-blooded.
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20 Although Leach’s folk-English scheme is a useful teaching example, it has always struck
me as problematic. Not only does it provide a suspiciously convenient taxonomy of all
living things that fits the logical conventions of a taxonomic approach, but it conflates
discourses that we know to be separate, and flies in the face of ethnographic evidence.
Unfortunately, ‘living things’ is a category that is easily yielded using formal elicitation
techniques, but it is less obvious once you aggregate data from different ethnographic
contexts.
 
Figure 7. Edmund Leach’s (1964) version of the English classification of nature
21 Possibly because of the pitfalls of definition, or in order to avoid the problems of using
it as a unique beginner in a taxonomic description, many accounts of ethnobiological
classification do not consider what is meant by a ‘living thing’ and get on with the
business of describing categories within the separate plant and animal domains. While
adopting the over-riding rubric of ‘ethnobiological classification’ and dwelling on the
formal criteria for establishing ‘folk-kingdoms’ of plant and animal, such an approach
is not interested in considering the unique beginner that might define the domain of
‘living things’.
22 Such  approaches,  however,  logically  assume  that  ‘living  things’  must  exist  as  a
phenomenon. Thus, if plants are living things and animals are living things, then there
must be a superordinate or more encompassing category that both belong to. But this
definition  assumes  that  we  are  only  dealing  with  what  might  be  conventionally
understood as ‘biological taxa’.
23 For another example of an early ethnoscience analysis of the category ‘living thing’, we
can do not better than look at a paper published by Mary Black in 1969 on the Ojibwa
category  /bema.diziwa.d/.  In  her  analysis  Black  shows,  using  a  distinctive  feature
approach, how the semantic content of the category varies depending on context of
elicitation, sometimes divided into ‘indians’, ‘white people’, ‘negroes’ and ‘asiatics’; in
others  into  ‘large  animals’,  ‘insects’  and  ‘other’;  in  still  others  into  ‘human’,  ‘large
animals’,  ‘small  animals’,  ‘birds’,  ‘fish’,  and  ‘spirits’.  Depending  on  informants,  the
category also sometimes includes ‘trees’, ‘stones’, ‘leaves’, ‘berries’, ‘shells’, ‘sun’ and
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the ‘moon’.  So,  in  Black’s  understanding of  Ojibwa ontology,  ‘living things’  may be
biological taxa, human ‘racial’ groups, spirits or astronomical entities, or almost any
combination.
 
Comparing biological and non-biological
classifications
24 Although we might dismiss some of these formal approaches as naïve, they do point at
some interesting similarities in the way in which the cultured mind makes sense of
domains as diverse as biodiversity, human groups, the spirit realm, and other ‘natural
kinds’, such as minerals. 
25 Seventeenth  century  European  natural  history  routinely  incorporated  minerals  as
‘natural kinds’.  Early attempts to systematically describe the ‘mineral kingdom’ and
related entities ‘dug out of the earth’ often followed the organization of local floras.
This approach was hardly novel even then. Rumphius (1999) in his Ambonese curiosity
cabinet of  1705  follows  Pliny,  juxtaposing  descriptions  of  species  of  crustacea,
echinoderms,  molluscs,  cephalopods,  minerals,  concretions,  etc.  Many are described
using a version of the Latin binomial system. Thus, a kind of crystal found in Ambon is
named  Crystallus  ambonica,  while Amianthus  ambonicus  is  a  variety  of  asbestos.  Also
included are curiosities such as cuttlefish stones, and Dendrites metallica (pieces of iron
found in trees).  Then there are fossils said to live under water but to petrify when
removed. In such schemes fossils provide both a link with living biota and a problem.
The idea that stones might reproduce, as Theophrastus suggested, had still not been
entirely repudiated.
26 Following  Rumphius,  Linnaeus  too  (1958-9),  in  his  Systema  naturae, attempted  a
taxonomy of mineral ‘species’. Such classifications and attempts to integrate minerals
in a more general taxonomic approach to natural history were eventually abandoned,
superseded in global science by different arrangements based on chemical composition.
However, the same thinking has been extended more recently to the humanly-made
world of artefacts. Drawing his inspiration from Berlin’s work on the universal features
of ethnobiological  classifications,  Cecil  Brown et  al. (1976) claimed to find the same
formal  features  of  taxonomy  in  the  organisation  of  other  domains,  including  both
human artefacts and spirits. See, for example, his rendering of the American English
tool taxonomy (Figure 8).
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Figure 8. American English ‘tool’ taxonomy (after Brown et al. 1976: 78)
27 In addition to treating certain tools in a ‘life-like’ way, Nuaulu distinguish entities that
have many of the qualities of life, but which in the ordinary way have no corporeal
existence. Like many peoples, they think of spirits as a kind of pseudo-organism and
represent  them  as  species-like  entities  that  can  be  ordered  in  terms  of  family
resemblances, even if, as Pascal Boyer (1994) argues, their conception as such violates
the intuitive  principles  that  some psychologists  have demonstrated for  the  domain
specificity  of  living  kinds.  Because  spirits  have  these  qualities  for  Nuaulu  they  are
sometimes also attributed with corporeal manifestations: they become birds, or lizards,
or indeed certain animals may always be regarded as the physical manifestations of
spirits, such as certain scarab and long-horned beetles, or the death adder. This is not
surprizing, since we can only imagine the spirit world through experience of our bodily
and social worlds. 
28 It was difficulties of this kind that pre-occupied Scott Atran in much of his Cognitive
foundations of natural history.For Atran (1990: 47), there is only a superficial similarity
between biological and non-biological domains ‘… with no other natural-object domain
so structured’. In concluding thus he draws on the support of field experiments in child
psychology and the work of Frank Keil. Keil (1979) has argued that children possess an
ontological category of living things that includes animals and plants, allowing Atran
(1990: 73-4) to claim that young children ‘categorically distinguish artefacts from living
things’  and  come  to  presume  that  only  the  latter  constitute  ‘natural  kinds’  with
underlying essences, while limiting certain concepts (such as growth) to living things. 
29 As well as using experimental data, Atran argues his case on logical grounds assuming
this to be a universal grammar. Transitive hierarchy, he reasons, works for living kinds
but not for artefacts, because the domain of artefacts fails to meet the inductive and
deductive requirements of ranked taxonomies. Biota, like artefacts are often placed in
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different categories (whether we call these taxa or not), and although he recognizes
that people often ‘confound’ artefacts with living kinds and ‘confuse’ plants with things
made from plants, the underlying field structures are quite different. If we are to argue
on the basis of logical formalism, then we might forgive ordinary people from deviating
from it in the practices of their ordinary lives. No wonder Atran dismisses that work in
developmental  psychology  (e.g.  Susan  Carey  1985)  that  shows  that  children  will
spontaneously attribute a common invented property, a kind of underlying nature, to
dogs, flowers and inanimate objects. Carey’s theories and data tend to support the idea
of  the  integration  of  domains  of  knowledge,  and  of  fundamental  ambiguity  in  the
concept of ‘natural kind’. 
 
The body, social cognition and the limits of modularity
30 While  we may still  wish to  argue that  there are  special  features  in  ethnobiological
classifications that distinguish them from the organisation of other domains, this has
less to do with the cognitive apparatus brought to bear on them than the pattern of
empirical discontinuities found in a particular ecological context. Similarly, the mind
cognizes  tools  in  the  same  way  as  living  organisms  partly  because  of  a  shared
architecture  but  also  because  our  models  of  apprehending  and  thinking  about  the
world derive from our own bodily experience, and from the social worlds of which we
are part. 
31 It has long been recognized that at the core of human cognition is a necessary duality
and tension whereby humans understand the natural world through their experience
of society, and the social world through their experience of nature. This is why despite
attempts to challenge the culture-nature divide, the divide keeps on re-emerging. It
happens because we are bound to model our world on experiences of our own body and
we employ representations and evocations of this experience as a source of labels and
concepts to interpret the world outside the body. More than this, if we ‘thingify’ or
‘entify’ parts of a living system, and then observe that the things move, so to speak, it
logically follows that the things may well be spoken of as if they were sentient beings;
they will appear as though they were indeed animated.
32 The organic models we use vary along a continuum from general organic analogies,
plant  analogies,  animal  analogies,  general  human  analogies,  and  the  attribution  of
particular personalities. It is as if the mind progressively ‘enlivens’ non-living entities,
and humanizes other entities in which it recognizes life. Thus, Nuaulu personify sacred
shields  that  they  attribute  with  soul.  The  shields  are  treated  with  reverence,
anthropomorphically, and granted personhood. 
 
Organomorphism, motion, agency, intention
33 Through the working out of the recent evolutionary history of the embodied brain, and
through polythetic linkage between different cognitive and semantic domains in any
particular cultural population, we will always find a group of things that are regarded
as life-like. But in attributing the notion of ‘life’ and more narrowly ‘animacy’, what
features does the mind latch on to? The evidence so far would suggest that we start
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with physical resemblance, since it is visually salient attributes that in most cases are
cognitively dominant. 
34 Some of  the  boundary  problems of  the  category  ‘living  matter’  are  raised  through
engagement  with  forms  of  life  that  do  not  fit  easily  into  the  cognitively—but  not
lexically—universal prototypical categories of ‘plant’ or ‘animal’, that are peripheral to
biological life as most ordinary people experience it.
35 In  Nuaulu ethnobiological  classification fungi,  algae and sponges are  classic  liminal
forms (Ellen 2008).  In their  classifying and naming strategies there is  a  tension for
Nuaulu  between  placing  fungi  with  plants  and  according  them  their  own  separate
‘kingdom’,  while seaweed is aligned with fungi through its nomenclature.  The term
unate refers to all visible fungi, but not lichens; and is also applied to sponges and to all
algal seaweed. The broadly inclusive character of unate is in itself interesting, given
that  mushrooms  are  extremely  varied  in  their  characteristics.  Since  there  can  be
considerable  morphological  differences,  say  between  bracket  fungi  and  the  highly
salient  coral  mushrooms,  we must  assume that  placing them together  must  reflect
some  combination  of  cognitive  prototype  and  common  distinctive  features.  Not
subsumed under unate are forms such as fruticose lichens , moulds and mildew, and
slime moulds, freshwater and terrestrial algae.
36 By deliberately selecting liminal forms we can test the extent to which the notion of
‘life’ applies, and if that test is passed whether such entities conform best to animal or
to plant prototypes. But we also need to recognize that both these prototypes are in
semantic  tension,  simultaneously  sharing  features  and  contrasting  them.  All  living
matter could be said to have both a vegetal and animalistic aspect, a ‘vegetal quality’
especially found in plants, and an ‘animal quality’ especially found in animals. This is
why  where  certain  peripheral  organisms  are  placed  in  classificatory  space  varies
between cultures, compared with the greater regularities reported for core vascular
plants and chordate animals. But in addition, we are also primed to look out for what is
potentially human in other parts of the living world. 
37 In the attribution of  life,  and even more so of  animacy in the sense of  ‘animality’,
morphological resemblance is not enough. As indispensible is motion, in all or any of its
manifestations. Everywhere liminal biological forms are attributed with animacy it is
because of a characteristic that is semantically rooted in movement or its metaphorical
extension, such as ‘locomotion’, ‘growth’, ‘reproduction’, ‘fragmentation’.
38 Even ‘eruption’ and ‘erosion’ are recognizably ‘kinds of motion’. When we talk about
the ‘living’ landscape we have in mind the idea that it is dynamic, whether vegetally,
animalistically  or  geomorphologically.  Time,  change  and  cause  are  all  described  in
various contexts as if they were like motion. 
39 As we move between the different types of Nuaulu tool, the stimuli amenable to the
attribution of life seem to increase. In the transition from skewer to sago pounder, and
from sago pounder to the sago flour extraction apparatus, from the treadle-operated
coconut grater to the outboard motor,  there is  a gradual shift  in the source of the
motion—and therefore seemingly of agency, from the using subject to the tool itself.
40 The term agency has been much stretched in recent anthropological  discussions of
animism and technology, but in this context I think we need to shrink it back to its
earlier core meaning of an intervention to produce a particular result, or something
with the  faculty  of  an agent.  So,  looking at  our selected Nuaulu tools,  on material
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grounds neither  the  meat  skewer nor  the  sago pounder  can be  said  to  have much
objective  agency,  though  more  agency  may  be  attributed  to  them.  More  complex
machines, with many parts form a system with emergent properties not entirely under
the control of the operator, and these might well be said to possess agency. Thus, this
would be the case for the sago-processing device, the coconut grater and the outboard
motor.
41 A quality that Nuaulu commonly associate with the essentials of animal and human life
is breathe (nahai), and breathe too is a kind of motion. Birth, the moment at which a
child breathes independently, when the chest begins to move and the lungs ventilate, is
the beginning of autonomous human life. Breathe as a concept is recurrent in ritual
and attributed to physical entities that are anthropomorphized, such as sacred houses
or ritual shields. Ritual shields, like the meat skewer, retain their organs of breathe in
the first chip of wood to be cut, and which is thereafter kept in the loft of a sacred
house. Most salient of all, however, is the literal extraction of the organs of breath of
large game animals and their offering as a sacrifice to the ancestors. In the asunaete 
ritual these same organs are attached to a skewer as a form of repayment for a life
taken,  and an assurance that life  will  thereby be replenished.  In humans and large
animals the physicality of breathe is clear enough, but in other biological organisms
and non-biological entities it is not, and here we find that vocalization may serve as a
proxy. So, when cicadas sing it is evidence of breathe, or even when the wind blows
through certain rocks to produce eerie sounds it may be taken as evidence of life.
 
Life is a matter of degree, while animacy is not
animism
42 I  am  hardly  the  first  to  argue  that  the  attribution  of  life  is  necessarily  gradual,
contextual and, from a biological perspective, inconveniently deviant. Bloch (1998: 53)
calls this the ‘more-or-less’ character of life. Ingold (2011) argues that we can make
anything seem alive, but we do not always chose to do so. Moreover, there is much
evidence that people do not agree about what life is and no universal distinction as to
what is alive and what not.
43 What I have tried to do here is to unpack those conditions for the recognition of life
and to show how they might constitute a series of  progressive cognitive steps that
when  aggregated  are  more  likely,  though  possibly  not  always,  to  prompt  the
attribution of life. These are: recognition of morphological resemblance, motion, and
independent  motion.  In  a  general  way  these  are  each  reflected  in  a  pattern  of
conceptual attribution that follows a broadly phylogenetic progression: we apprehend
physical entities as being plant-like, animal-like, human-like and – ultimately – like
individual human persons.
44 Part  of  the  problem  in  the  literature  is  that  discourses  on  bio-cognition,  life  and
animism begin from different starting points and have different intellectual histories.
While analytically we need to separate these and certainly not confuse and conflate
concepts  and  terms,  in  particular  cases  it  is  unlikely  that  we  will  ever  discover  a
convenient congruence. 
45 The  preparation  for  this  workshop  suggests  that  we  need  to  separate  vital  from
symbolic  forces  –  that  we need both ‘vital  and symbolic  ontologies’,  just  as  Marcel
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Mauss  suggested  we  separate  technical  from  symbolic  classifications,  and  Berlin
general-purpose ‘natural’ schemes from special-purpose schemes. Unfortunately real-
life examples do not give us much hope that this is possible. In some cases we may find
evidence of two life forces (spiritual and biological) as Laura Rival (2012) suggests for
Makushi cassava, but my guess is that because vital and technical processes are already
situated in relational complexes when we experience them, in practical everyday life
organisms and things are treated as though they are motivated by a single underlying
force, unless prompted by reflexive theology.
46 While all  cultural objects are potentially regarded in this way, in practice some are
more alive, are more likely to evoke the characteristics of agency, animacy or indeed
intentionality than others. The same applies to animism, with which the attribution of
life is too readily conflated. If, following Descola (2007), animism is ‘the granting by
humans to non-humans of an interiority identical to theirs’ (Rival 2012: 70) I would say
that it is virtually impossible to separate ethnotheories of life processes from what is
sometimes described as animism, even though not every object in nature is animated,
and animism is not totalizing. 
47 Moreover,  regardless of  the arguments surrounding how we might best  understand
‘animism’  as  a  worldview,  whether  we  are  considering  humans  or  other  species
(including dogs), we can observe a tendency for the mind to use an understanding of
living bodies to interpret experience of artifacts, including tools. When these exhibit
evidence of motion, and especially independent motion, objects prompt responses and
interactions that suggest recognition of animacy, agency and intentionality to different
degrees. In this respect we can agree with Ingold (2011), that if we are unsure whether
something might be alive or not it is prudent to assume that it is. We have evolved a
tendency to attribute the characteristics of life to parts of the world and to the world as
a  whole,  since  our  experience  of  existence  is  how  we  must  represent,  model,
understand and act in the world.
48 A final word on motion. Motion is often a necessary condition for the recognition of
life,  but  is  seldom  sufficient.  Motion  is  often  accompanied  by  multi-sensorial
characteristics shared with biological life, for example the expenditure of heat and the
emission of sound. But while none of the clanking, whirring and buzzing of the treadle-
operated coconut grater, or even the sloshing and slapping of a sago-processing device
are sufficient for Nuaulu to conceive them as living entities, the same features in an
outboard motor are intrinsic to recognition of its animate status. For while the first two
have the technical characteristics of a machine they do not have the autonomy of an
engine.
49 These technical distinctions are fully understood by Nuaulu who have wondrous ways
of  fixing  malfunctioning  engines.  But  the  combined features  that  give  them quasi-
autonomy also give them the vitality that is more than the combination of their parts,
and  which  crosses  a  boundary  that  places  them  with  other  biological  and  quasi-
biological  entities.  Humanly  operated  machines  may  have  agency,  but  engines  act
‘intentionally’.  When Basil  Fawlty is thrashing the car he is exacting revenge on an
entity that has ‘stalled just once too often’.  It has willfully disobeyed its owner and
driver. We laugh because we recognize that all of us, while fully accepting the technical
reasons for mechanical failure, insist on treating the vehicle as if it were a sentient
person who is deliberately contrary.
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ABSTRACTS
Both humans and other animals attribute the qualities of living matter and agency to what we
call  tools  and  other  cultural  objects.  In  both  cases  a  paradox  may  arise  when  autonomy  is
attributed to the object at the same time that it is recognized that its life-like characteristics are
motivated by human actions. Nuaulu people in eastern Indonesia describe many kinds of objects
as  having  the  qualities  we  might  otherwise  reserve  for  biological  organisms.  They  also
distinguish entities that have many of the qualities of life but which ordinarily have no corporeal
existence (spirits).  While all  cultural objects are potentially regarded in this way,  in practice
some objects are more alive and have more agency than others. I argue that part of the problem
with existing anthropological treatments of the category “living things” is that they are either
logical extrapolations through polythetic extension or based on formal taxonomic deduction/
induction (ethnoscience). Using examples of meat-skewers, outboard motors, coconut graters,
and sago-processing devices,  together with certain forms of  biological  life  such as  fungi  and
algae, I demonstrate how Nuaulu ideas of what is animate and agentive are always fuzzy and
contingent,  and that  by combining data  from different  kinds  of  ethnographic  context,  using
different elicitation procedures, a more complex picture emerges.
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